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Abstract
Because most materials, including metals, will burn in an oxygen-enriched environment,
hazards are always present when using oxygen. Most materials will ignite at lower
temperatures in an oxygen-enriched environment than in air, and once ignited, combustion
rates are greater in the oxygen-enriched environment. Many metals burn violently in an
oxygen-enriched environment when ignited. Lubricants, tapes, gaskets, fuels, and solvents
can increase the possibility of ignition in oxygen systems. However, these hazards do not
preclude the use of oxygen. Oxygen may be safely used if all the materials in a system are
not flammable in the end-use environment or if ignition sources are identified and
controlled. These ignition and combustion hazards necessitate a proper oxygen hazards
analysis before introducing a material or component into oxygen service.
The objective of this test plan is to describe the White Sands Test Facility oxygen hazards
analysis to be performed on components and systems before oxygen is introduced and is
recommended before implementing the oxygen component qualification procedure. The
plan describes the NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility method
consistent with the ASTM documents for analyzing the hazards of components and systems
exposed to an oxygen-enriched environment. The oxygen hazards analysis is a useful tool
for oxygen-system designers, system engineers, and facility managers. Problem areas can
be pinpointed before oxygen is introduced into the system, preventing damage to hardware
and possible injury or loss of life.
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1. Introduction
Because most materials, including metals, will burn in an oxygen-enriched environment,
hazards are always present when using oxygen. Most materials will ignite at considerably
lower temperatures in an oxygen-enriched environment than in air, and once ignited,
combustion rates are greater in the oxygen-enriched environment. Many metals burn
violently in an oxygen-enriched environment when ignited. Lubricants, tapes, gaskets,
fuels, and solvents can increase the possibility of ignition in oxygen systems. However,
these hazards do not preclude the use of oxygen. Oxygen may be safely used if all the
materials in a system are not flammable in the end-use environment or if ignition sources
are identified and controlled. Ignition and combustion hazards necessitate a proper oxygen
hazards analysis before introducing a material or component into oxygen service.
This test plan describes the NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility
(WSTF) method (consistent with the most current versions of ASTMs G 63, G 88, and G
94) for analyzing the hazards of components and systems exposed to oxygen-enriched
environments. The oxygen hazards analysis is a useful tool for oxygen-system designers,
system engineers, and facility managers. Problem areas can be pinpointed before oxygen is
introduced into the system, preventing damage to hardware and possible injury or loss of
life. Further information on the safe design of oxygen systems can be found in the most
current versions of ASTMs G 63, G 88, and G 94; NHB 8060.1C (1991); NFPAs 50
(1990) and 53M (1990); and CGAs G-4.0 (1987), G-4.1 (1984), and G-4.4 (1984).
2. Objective
The objective of this test plan is to describe the WSTF oxygen hazards analysis to be
performed on components and systems before oxygen is introduced. The analysis should
be performed before implementing the oxygen component qualification procedure
(Bamford and Rucker, 1992).
3. Approach
An oxygen hazards analysis of an oxygen component or system is usually approached as
shown in Figure 1 (Christianson and Stoltzfus, 1993). The oxygen application and the
scope of the investigation are first determined, and then a team is assembled to conduct the
analysis. Information is collected on the components and the worst-case operating
conditions.
Usually, a fire will not occur in any environment unless the construction materials of the
system or component are flammable and a credible ignition mechanism is present. The
flammability of the material is first reviewed to determine if any fire hazards exist at the
worst-case operating conditions. If the material is flammable, then the possible ignition
mechanisms are surveyed to determine which are credible. If data for the particular ignition
mechanism and the material(s) under consideration are not available, appropriate materials
tests are conducted. Finally, the secondary and reaction effects are evaluated to determine
what effect an ignition and possible combustion would have on the system and the facility
(Christianson and Stoltzfus, 1993).
Figure 1 Approach to oxygen hazards analysis (Christianson and Stoltzfus, 1993).
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To use an oxygen hazards analysis as a tool, it should be properly documented from the
beginning. A typical oxygen hazards analysis chart (Figure 2) contains the component
designation (which indicates the materials of construction including soft goods), the
possible ignition mechanisms, the probability of each ignition mechanism, and the results
of the secondary effects analysis and the reaction effects assessment. The documentation
also includes any recommendations or limitations from the oxygen hazards analysis team,
including recommendations of further testing if needed, stipulations of use, and any
additional safety precautions. If component tests are required, they may be performed
according to the Guide for Oxygen Component Qualification Tests (Bamford and Rucker,
1992).
Materials
	
Ignition Hazards	 Secondary Effect
F = Flammable
	 0 = Impossible 3 = Possible
	 + = Analysis of affectedN = Nonflammable
	 I = Remote
	 4 = Proboblecomponents needed2 = UnUkely
	
— = No further analysis
needed
Figure 2 Oxygen Hazards Analysis Chart.
4. Procedures
The procedures for performing an oxygen hazards analysis on a component or a system are
shown in Figure 1 and discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.1 Oxygen Application and Investigation Scope
The oxygen application and investigation scope should first be determined to provide the
basis for choosing the oxygen hazards analysis team and for conducting the analysis.
4.2 Oxygen Hazards Analysis Team
An oxygen hazards analysis team is assembled including, at a minimum, personnel with
expertise in mechanical design, metals ignition and combustion, nonmetals ignition and
combustion, and component testing (with emphasis on oxygen systems). Depending on the
system, personnel may also be included with expertise in electrical design, cryogenic
fluids, materials, and chemistry.
4.3 Component/System Information
Information is obtained on each component in the system: materials of construction
(including soft goods and lubricants), drawings showing the cross-sectional view of each
component (particularly fluid flow paths and the location of the soft goods), and a system
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fluid schematic. The cross section of the component is used to locate and identify all the
soft goods. If the cross-sectional view of a component is poor quality or unclear, a
disassembled component complete with soft goods is sometimes useful. All materials of
construction are identified. The flow path is also identified, along with all oxygen-wetted
materials. A list of some common high-risk components is in the appendix.
4.4 Worst-Case Operating Conditions
The worst-case operating conditions that the component may undergo are now determined.
This information includes maximum use pressures, temperatures, and flow rates and is
used to evaluate the materials of construction for resistance to ignition and combustion.
Pressures and temperatures are important because material flammability is often a function
of these two parameters. Flow rates are important because they affect the particle impact
and adiabatic compression ignition mechanisms.
4.5 Material Flammability
The materials are evaluated to determine if they are flammable at the worst-case operating
conditions. A large material flammability database at WSTF contains flammability data
from previous and ongoing tests of both metals and polymers. If information on a material
for the worst-case operating conditions cannot be located in the database, tests may be
conducted to obtain this information. The oxygen hazards analysis chart is updated with the
results, using N (nonflammable) or F (flammable). If the materials of a component are
determined nonflammable, the ignition mechanisms need not be analyzed for that
component.
4.6 Ignition Mechanisms
Next, an ignition mechanism survey is performed. For each component found to have
flammable materials, nine ignition mechanisms must be evaluated: adiabatic compression
(pneumatic impact), frictional heating, mechanical impact, particle impact, mechanical
stress or vibration, static discharge, electric arc, chemical reaction, and resonance. Each
ignition mechanism must be evaluated to determine if it exists in the component and the
likelihood that it will cause an ignition. The results of the analysis for each ignition
mechanism are documented on the oxygen hazards analysis chart. Ratings for the ignition
mechanisms are 0 (impossible), 1 (remote), 2 (unlikely), 3 (possible), and 4 (probable).
4.6.1 Frictional Heating
Parts of a component or system can rub against each other with enough force or velocity to
raise any one part to its ignition temperature at the given oxygen pressure and concentration
(examples: rotating or oscillating equipment and chattering relief valves).
4.6.2 Adiabatic Compression
A quantity of any gas can generate a considerable amount of heat if rapidly compressed.
This heat can readily ignite polymers or flammable contaminants (examples: a downstream
valve or flexible hose with a polymer liner in a dead-ended high-pressure oxygen
manifold).
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4.6.3 Mechanical Impact
An object with a relatively large mass or momentum striking a material can cause
mechanical deformation and expose fresh surfaces (example: a poppet of a solenoid-
operated valve impacting the polymer seat).
4.6.4 Particle Impact
Combustible particles impinging on materials at velocities greater than 50 m/s in oxygen-
enriched environments can cause ignition (example: high-velocity particles from a dirty
pipeline striking a valve plunger).
4.6.5 Mechanical Stress or Vibration
Materials that are poor heat conductors (such as plastics) can reach their ignition
temperatures when stressed or vibrated (example: unanchored joints that protrude inside
piping).
4.6.6 Static Discharge
Discharges of static electricity can produce high temperatures, sometimes high enough to
cause a material to reach its ignition temperature (example: the accumulation of electrostatic
charges created by the friction of dry oxygen flowing over nonmetals).
4.6.7 Electric Arc
Electric arcs can provide the energy to ignite materials in the presence of oxygen (example:
an insulated electrical heater short-circuiting and arcing through its sheath to the oxygen).
4.6.8 Chemical Reaction
An unrelated chemical reaction can produce sufficient heat to ignite materials in the presence
of oxygen (example: a chemical process that generates elevated temperatures).
4.6.9 Resonance
Acoustic oscillations within resonant cavities can cause a rapid gas temperature rise. The
rise is more rapid and achieves higher values when particles are present. Ignition can result
if the heat generated is not rapidly dissipated (example: gas flow into a tee and out of a
branch port so that the remaining closed port forms a resonant chamber).
4.7 Secondary Effects Analysis
After the ignition mechanisms have been surveyed, the secondary effects are analyzed. This
analysis addresses the effects of failures that are not ignition-related, but may create an
ignition hazard in a nearby component, such as an external leak caused by normal seal
wear. The leaking oxygen could build up and allow an ignition by the static discharge
ignition mechanism in some nearby component. Ratings for the secondary effects analysis
are + (further analysis of affected components necessary) and - (no further analysis
needed).
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4.8 Reaction Effects Assessment
Finally, a reaction effects assessment is performed and documented. This is an assessment
of the effect if a component fails or is ignited and is useful for making judgments on the
safe use of a component. The reaction effects assessment would then help determine if the
component may be used safely. The ratings are A (negligible, no loss of equipment or life),
B (marginal, equipment is damaged, but no lives are lost), C (critical, loss of test data and
damage to equipment, but no loss of life), and D (catastrophic, loss of equipment and life).
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Appendix
High-Risk Components
Many of the typical components found in oxygen systems are particularly susceptible to
one or more of the 10 possible ignition mechanisms. The following is a list of some of
these components and the associated ignition mechanisms.
Ball Valve: Particulate generation (particle impact) and quick-opening (adiabatic
compression)
Relief Valve: Chattering (mechanical impact or frictional heating)
Globe Valve: Impingement even when fully open (particle impact)
Butterfly Valve: Impingement even when fully open (particle impact)
Flex Hose: Susceptible to adiabatic compression when dead-ended
Regulator: Mechanical impact and high velocities generated (particle impact)
Check valve: Chattering (mechanical impact/frictional heating)
Filter: Pneumatic impact of contaminants on the filter element and possible
particle impact if poorly located within the system
Fittings:
	 Particulate introduced into the system during assembly (particle
impact)
Soft goods:	 Impingement on polymers in gas stream (pneumatic impact,
mechanical impact, and particle impact)
Most ignition mechanisms for the above components can be eliminated or minimized by
proper material selection, system design, and operating constraints.
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